operation iraqi dom operation enduring dom

The glaring weakness of the Iraqi forces limits the lessons that can be drawn from this conflict.Shortcomings in planning, leadership, command and control, coordination, battlefield positioning, situational awareness, and training plagued the Iraqi forces and severely diminished morale among troops.Saddam was preoccupied with internal threats to his person as well as his regime, leading him to shape his forces with an eye to forestalling coups rather than defending the country.Strategic miscalculations on the part of Saddam Hussein led to deployments of Iraqi forces to the north and east, leaving these forces in poor position to counter an attack from the south.Iraq's rapid collapse was due to a number of factors. Problems arose from the failure of the planning process to identify resource requirements for the transition from combat to post-combat operations, as well as from the failure to challenge assumptions about what postwar Iraq would look like.Planning was effective in producing a quick and decisive defeat of Iraqi military forces yet ineffective in preparing for postwar operations. Nevertheless, the report’s recommendations are provided as they were originally formulated. In other cases, some recommendations might already have been implemented in whole or in part. Also, because the research conducted for this report covers events only through June 2004, events that occurred after that date would alter some of the conclusions and recommendations. It addresses strategy, planning, and organization for OIF air and ground force operations personnel, deployment, and logistics issues coalition operations the occupation that followed combat operations and civil-military operations. It traces the operation from its root causes in the first Gulf War through operations up to approximately the end of June 2004.

This report presents a broad overview of the study findings based on unclassified source material.

RAND analysts collected the information in this report from many sources, including unit after-action reports, compilations of lessons learned, official databases, media reports, other contemporary records, and interviews with key participants in OIF. Although focused primarily on Army forces and activities, the analysis also describes aspects of joint and multinational operations.

The resulting analysis, completed in January 2006, will interest those involved in organizing, training, and equipping military forces to plan for, deploy to, participate in, and support joint and multinational operations. Soon after Operation IRAQI FREEDOM (OIF) began in March 2003, RAND Arroyo Center began compiling an authoritative account of the planning and execution of combat and stability operations in Iraq through 2004 in order to identify key issues that could affect Army plans, operational concepts, doctrine, and other Title 10 functions.

Operation iraqi dom operation enduring dom